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Abstract—This paper studies the applicability of peer-to-peer
(P2P) energy trading in a grid-tied network. The main objectives
are to understand the impact of the financial P2P energy trading
on the network operation, and thus demonstrate the importance
of taking various issues related to power network into account
while designing a practical P2P trading scheme. To do so,
a simple mechanism is developed for energy trading among
prosumers without considering any network constraints, as done
by many existing studies. Once the trading parameters, such
as the energy traded by each prosumer in the P2P market
and the price per unit of energy are determined, the developed
scheme is tested on a low-voltage (LV) network model to check
its feasibility of deployment in a real P2P network. It is shown
that although the considered trading scheme is economically
beneficial to the participating prosumers compared to the existing
incentive mechanisms (such as feed-in-tariff), it could be unfit
for real deployment due to violating bus voltage limits during
multiple P2P trading executed simultaneously. Further, the grid
operator may experience financial losses for compensating the
losses during P2P transactions.
Index Terms—Prosumers, P2P trading, economic benefits,
power network constraints, power flow.
I. INTRODUCTION
Rooftop solar installation has been beneficial for the society
due to the numerous economic and environmental advantages
that it demonstrates [1]. It has also allowed traditional passive
consumers to become active prosumers. These prosumers can
locally generate clean energy to meet their own demand and
sell the energy surplus for monetary gains [2]. Feed-in-tariff
(FiT) incentive scheme permits prosumers to sell their excess
energy to the grid (or equivalently to the retailers) at a fixed
price per unit of energy [3]. In order to promote the rapid
uptake of rooftop solar generation and to benefit the local com-
munity, FiT tariff was initially set high, for instance, around 44
¢/kWh in Queensland, Australia in 2008 [4]. It continued for
few years and then dropped considerably to 8 c/kWh in 2014
due to raising electricity retail prices for non-solar households.
In fact, some applicants started installing rooftop solar beyond
their household requirements with the intention of earning
money via FiT, which was against the purpose of the FiT
scheme [4]. Currently, Queensland has fixed FiT rate nearly
to 11 ¢/kWh [5], while the average electricity retail price is
20.3 ¢/kWh (during off-peak hours) and 25.6 ¢/kWh (during
peak hours) [6]. Consequently, the benefit to a prosumer
for participating in FiT scheme has become very marginal.
Therefore, alternative consumer-centric market approaches are
required to consider in which significant number of prosumers
can receive financial benefits through local energy trading.
Peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading is such type of distributed
market structure that enables prosumers to trade energy among
themselves at negotiated prices. As a result, they are likely
to receive more attractive economic benefits than the present
FiT scheme [7]. The operation of the P2P trading can be
divided into two parts, namely financial trading and physical
trading [7]. A number of proposals has been presented by
the researchers on advanced financial trading framework. For
instance, prospective P2P market price schemes, policies, rules
and regulations have been studied in [8] and [9]. Cooperative
trading approach has been proposed in [10] to incentivise
prosumers. In this framework, prosumers form groups depend-
ing on their cooperative behaviour and the profit earned via
P2P trading is equally distributed among the prosumers of the
group. An alternative approach is used for P2P trading in [11],
in which an individual prosumer can make financial trading
decisions independently.
In the existing literature, however, a little attention has been
paid towards the physical P2P energy transfer. It is obvious
that a valid P2P transaction should not violate the bus voltage
limits set by the upper grid. In addition, the impact of P2P
trading on the network losses in a grid-connected system
should be identified clearly. For example, losses allocation
during local energy trading has been provided in [12] and
[13]. However, they did not show the financial impact of
the transaction losses on the grid. For the voltage, authors
in [14] have shown that their proposed financial model does
not violate the network voltage limits during small amount of
energy transfer. In reality, it is most likely that small amount
of energy exchange at a single feeder would not create notable
voltage problems. Nevertheless, significant presence of rooftop
solar generators, stationary and mobile storage devices, and
modern energy management systems will increase the amount
of locally-traded energy in the future, which may result in
violating the bus voltage limit.
This paper focuses on investigating the network problems
that a financially attractive P2P trading can introduce in a
power network. To achieve this goal, a simple P2P trading
mechanism is presented which can find out the P2P market
solutions quickly without requiring rigorous computational
efforts. Then, the monetary gains that P2P trading can offer to
the prosumers compared to the existing mechanisms (i.e., retail
prices and FiT rate) are assessed. Finally, the trading quantity
is applied on a LV network to identify the possible network
issues associated with P2P trading at the physical layer.
Please note that the financial layer in this paper (i.e., the
trading algorithm) is intentionally designed to be simple and
intuitive because its simplicity allowed us to explain the phys-
ical layer’s problems more effectively, without distracting the
readers by the complexity of the financial trading algorithm.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section II
describes a simple rule-based P2P trading mechanism. The
issues that a P2P trading is likely to create on the physical
network along with intuitive methods to compute them are
discussed in Section III. Section IV contains the simulation
studies and results. Finally, the concluding remarks are given
in Section V.
II. FINANCIAL P2P TRADING ALGORITHM
In this section, prosumers’ selection process, P2P pricing
strategy, and the trading algorithm are explained.
A. Market Setup
It is assumed that all prosumers are equipped with a
blockchain (BC) account, by which they can communicate
with other participants directly. In short, BC is a decentralised
communication technology that offers fast, efficient, secure,
reliable, and transparent P2P transactions [7]. They are also
assumed to have a smart meter known as trans-active meter
(TAM). TAM simultaneously monitors and records the local
generation at the prosumers’ side. The TAM will send a signal
to the corresponding BC account when there is an energy
surplus or deficiency. Once signal is received by the BC
platform, prosumers will start communicating with each other
[7]. Fig. 1 illustrates a hypothetical P2P market and the direct
communication links among prosumers using BC technology.
It is assumed that the prosumers are not allowed to sell and buy
energy simultaneously. Therefore, prosumers can be identified
either as a seller or a buyer for a given time interval. It is
also assumed that the sellers use energy internally as much
as needed and only offer excess energy to the P2P market.
In addition, the sellers and buyers will declare their prices in
every P2P intervals. Once agreed on a BC ledger for a trading
interval, the P2P market rules, presented in [9], will not permit
the prosumers to change their prices for that interval.
In this paper, a prospective approach is adopted to arrange
the priority order of sellers and buyers when multiple pro-
sumers wish to participate in the P2P trading. The sellers’
order are settled based on the least declared price. For the
buyers, priority is given in the order in which they registered
using their BC account, i.e., BC registration order (BCRO).
B. P2P Pricing Mechanism
Let St = {cs,ps} and Bt = {cb,pb} be the set of
price and quantity pairs of all sellers and buyers, respectively,
registered in the market for trading period t. The sellers
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Fig. 1. A local market structure based on P2P communication.
price and quantity are cs in {cs,1, cs,2, . . . , cs,S} and ps in
{ps,1, ps,2, . . . , ps,S}, respectively, for S sellers. The buyers
price and quantity are cb in {cb,1, cb,2, . . . , cb,B} and pb in
{pb,1, pb,2, . . . , pb,B}, respectively, for B buyers. Also assume
that the sets are sorted based on the approach proposed in
Subsection II-A. Based on the mid-market rate (MMR) method
[8], the P2P trading price λ (k|i, j) for ρ (k|i, j) kW power
exchange between seller i and buyer j can be defined as the
middle value of cs,i and cb,j for a specific transaction:
λ (k|i, j) =
cs,i + cb,j
2
(1)
where λ (k|i, j) is the price of the kth transaction in Λt =
{λ (1|·, ·) , λ (2|·, ·) , · · · , λ (K|·, ·)} for ρ (k|i, j) power ex-
change in Pt = {ρ (1|·, ·) , ρ (2|·, ·) , · · · , ρ (K|·, ·)} at time
t. Please note that the participants can trade with multiple
prosumers in the market at time t. Therefore, the number of
transactions, K , is not necessarily the same as the number of
buyers and/or sellers. In that case, average P2P trading prices
for each seller and buyer, λi and λj , are calculated as follows:

λi =
∑
j
λ(·|i,j)/Ji ∀ i ∈ {1, · · · , S}
λj =
∑
i
λ(·|i,j)/Ij ∀ j ∈ {1, · · · , B}
(2)
where Ji and Ij are the number of transactions for seller
i and buyer j, respectively. In reality, both local generation
and demand vary in time. Accordingly, the prices offered by
the buyers and sellers vary over time. When local generation
is not available or not sufficient to cover the load demand,
the buyers should pay at the grid price, which is higher
than the local generation price. In the existing arrangement
at the distribution level in many countries (such as Australia),
sellers inject excess energy to the network in exchange for
the FiT price, λFiT. Any deficiency in the load demand will
also be compensated by the grid (or retailers) at the retail
price, λOn–Peak and λOff–Peak for time-of-use (ToU) tariffs.
Hence, sellers’ profit (Mi) and buyers’ savings (Mj) from
participating in the P2P market for the entire day can be
calculated by,

Mi =
∑
t
∑
j
(λ( · |i, j )−λFiT)× ρ (·|i, j)×∆t
Mj =
∑
t
∑
i
(
λ(·) − λ
(
· |i, j ))× ρ (·|i, j)×∆t
(3)
where ∆t is the trading time interval in hour, and λ(·)
represents ToU prices of the grid, i.e., λOn–Peak and λOff–Peak,
in ¢/kWh. In Subsection IV-A, daily profits and savings are
calculated for a case study with P2P trading framework.
When a deal is finalised between seller i and buyer j, the
agreed quantity, ρ (k|i, j), will be reported to the grid operator.
Also, the actual amount of power traded during that time
interval will be recorded by the TAMs, and the measurements
will be available to the grid for billing. At the end of a billing
cycle, P2P transactions will be deducted by the electricity
retailers from the local generation and demand to calculate
sellers’ payment and buyers’ bill. The TAM readings can also
be used to settle the payments among P2P participants.
C. Trading Algorithm
The trading mechanism is given in Algorithm 1. Unlike
other approaches, such as game theoretic [10], [11], it finds the
solution quickly while requiring less computational efforts. As
explained earlier, sellers and buyers are sorted based on the
minimum seller price and the buyer registration order in St
and Bt sets, respectively, in the first step. In the next step,
sellers’ power, ps, and buyers’ demand, pb, at time t are
adjusted so that the total supply and load demand are equal,
i.e.,
∑
ps =
∑
pb. The algorithm informs affected prosumers
about the generation curtailment or energy shortage within the
market. Nevertheless, any mismatch will be compensated by
the grid, and it will be settled outside of the P2P market at
the retailer FiT or ToU prices, as explained in subsection II-B.
In the final step, trading among sellers and buyers is carried
out at P2P prices. The procedure starts with the first seller,
(cs,1, ps,1), and buyer, (cb,1, pb,1), from the list. The trading
price, λ (1|1, 1), will be calculated by Eq. (1) and the traded
power will be ρ (1|1, 1). If the buyer’s load, pb,1, is less
than the seller’s supply, ps,1, the remainder energy will be
traded with the next buyer in the list, which forms transaction
ρ (2|1, 2) at λ (2|1, 2) price. Similarly, if the seller is not
able to satisfy the load, pb,1, next seller will be considered,
i.e., transaction ρ (2|2, 1) at λ (2|2, 1) price. This process will
continue until all buyers and sellers are satisfied.
III. PHYSICAL P2P TRADING
Most of the P2P trading markets are expected to be de-
veloped in grid-tied systems. To examine the impact of P2P
trading on the grid-connected networks, two case studies are
presented, which are explained in details below:
A. Bus Voltage Assessment
Whether participating in the P2P market or selling at the
FiT price to the grid, the excess local generation injected to
the network can cause over-voltage issues in the low-voltage
(LV) networks. In an attempt to reduce the voltage issues,
modern rooftop solar inverters are manufactured to sink/source
reactive power to regulate voltage at the point of common
coupling (PCC) to some extent. According to some grid codes,
advanced inverters are recommended for the new rooftop solar
installations. In this case, it is important to consider the impact
Algorithm 1 A Rule-based P2P Trading Mechanism
1: Input Parameters: S,B
2: for S sellers and B buyers do
3: STEP 1: SORTING PROSUMERS
4: S ← min {cs}
5: B ← BCRO
6: STEP 2: POWER BALANCE
7: while (
∑
ps 6=
∑
pb) do
8: if (
∑
ps >
∑
pb) then
9: Curtail most expensive seller
10: else
11: Curtail last registered buyer
12: end if
13: end while
14: STEP 3: P2P TRADING
15: for j in B buyers do
16: while
∑
i ρ (·|i, j) 6= pb,j do
17: purchase from cheapest seller
18: calculate price in Eq. (1)
19: calculate average price in Eq. (2)
20: end while
21: end for
22: end for
of active power trading on the network voltage profiles so
that the amount of traded active power is decided based on
the network conditions. Otherwise, the inverters automatically
curtail active power injection to regulate voltage at the PCC.
Let’s consider a scenario, in which seller i trades
∑
j ρ(k|i, j)
kW power at time t with buyers. If injecting that amount of
power triggers upper voltage violation, the inverter will curtail
injected power (by absorbing reactive power) for voltage
regulation. As a result, seller i will be penalised in the final
billing settlement for not delivering
∑
j ρ(k|i, j) kW power.
This problem has been shown in the simulation results for a
specific case in Subsection IV-B.
B. Hypothetical Transaction Losses
In many energy trading algorithms, the losses caused by
the P2P transactions are avoided without adequate technical
justifications. As a result, buyers and sellers agree upon a
quantity and price that does not account for the losses in
the system, which means that the buyers never receive the
exact amount of power promised by the sellers due to the
losses (if any). In fact, the further the buyers are from the
sellers, the more could be the transaction losses. In the case
of connection to an upper grid, the transaction losses (if any)
should be compensated by the grid without being reflected in
the electricity bills, i.e., free of charge. The reason is that the
TAM readings only verifies the injected power at the seller’s
PCC, it does not give a hint about the incurred transaction
losses (if any). To calculate the hypothetical losses for one or
more P2P transactions, the below steps are followed:
Step 1: Run a power flow study, where all injected power
are assumed to be zero, i.e., ps = 0, which is called Case I.
Then, measure the total power imported from the grid, P Ig;
Step 2: Perform a power flow study with the hypothetical
P2P market solutions, which is termed as Case II. Then, reads
the power flow through the distribution grid and call it P IIg .
The difference between P IIg and P
I
g is the total losses
associated with all P2P transactions within a given time slot.
IV. SIMULATION STUDIES
This section considers a 27 bus distribution test system,
shown in Fig. 2, for a comprehensive simulation study. Bus,
branch, and load data of the system are taken from [15].
All the sellers and buyers are connected to different buses
randomly. Three simulation studies are performed pertaining
to P2P trading. First study discusses the economic benefits
that both sellers and buyers can receive by participating in the
P2P market in a typical day, whereas the other two studies
highlight the network issues that are likely to happen during
physical P2P trading.
A. Economic Benefits
In this simulation study, five prosumers have been consid-
ered, the details of which are given in Table I. At the beginning
of each trading interval, prosumers have been allowed to
submit their preferred prices arbitrarily within a specified price
range. The price range has been set below the retailer offers
and above the FiT rate so that all participants make profits.
Without loss of generality, the prosumers’ prices are assumed
to be the same in all trading intervals. Importantly, it is not
necessary that sellers’ price should be lower than buyers’ price
or vice-versa. Rather, MMR method has been used to calculate
the trading price from sellers’ and buyers’ declared prices.
TABLE I
DETAILS OF THE PROSUMERS
Prosumers Trading Identity Declared Price (¢/kWh) BCRO
1 Buyer 1 15 2
2 Buyer 2 14 1
3 Seller 1 17 4
4 Seller 2 15 5
5 Seller 3 16 3
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Fig. 2. 0.4 kV Danish LV distribution grid model [15].
The daily energy profile of the prosumers with 15 minutes
interval as well as the local retail prices are taken from a
Brisbane-based research centre. It is assumed that the net load
(internal demand minus local generation) represents sellers’
excess energy. Therefore, the negative value of the net load
enables sellers to exchange energy with the buyers. The rule-
based P2P trading algorithm is executed for the entire day for
the prosumers at hand. Fig. 3 shows the P2P trading prices for
the participants compared to the retail prices. Since the grid
prices, i.e., λOn-Peak and λOff-Peak, are quite higher than the
P2P trading prices, i.e., λ (·|i, j), buyers are expected to save
some money. In this study, Buyer 2 and Buyer 1 can save
$3.13 and $1.5, respectively, in the course of a day. Please
note that Buyer 2 registered first and got the chance to trade
first in the P2P market at lower prices. On the other hand,
the FiT rate, λFiT, is by far lower than the P2P trading prices.
Hence, sellers can earn more profits by trading in the P2P
market compared to selling energy to the grid at FiT rate. In
the simulation study, Seller 2 earns $1.24 more at the end of
the day, followed by Seller 3 ($0.3) and Seller 1 (¢8.8). Please
note that Seller 1 asked for higher price and thus, traded less
in the P2P market. In summary, it can be concluded that the
more prosumers participate in the P2P trading, the more they
can gain financial benefits.
Fig. 3. Financial benefits of P2P trading for all participants.
B. High Voltage Issue
Let’s assume a scenario, where different houses at buses 2-6
on feeder F1, in Fig. 2, have installed rooftop PV panels. Seller
2 (at bus 2) sells 2.8 kW to Buyer 2 (at bus 3) and 1.4 kW to
Buyer 1 (at bus 6) at time t. Seller 1 (at bus 5) and Seller 3 (at
bus 4) also start selling their excess energy at the same time.
They are injecting 3.7 kW and 3.5 kW power, respectively,
to trade with buyers at bus 14 and bus 19. Therefore, ps =
{3.7, 4.2, 3.5} kW and pb = {2.8, 1.4, 3.7, 3.5} kW.
Fig. 4 reveals that simultaneous P2P transactions can rise the
bus voltages of F1 beyond the limit prescribed in Queensland,
Australia [16]. For instance, voltage at bus 5 crosses the upper
voltage limit while buses 2, 4 and 6 are very close to exceed
it as well. Therefore, multiple P2P trading inside a single
feeder can cause over-voltage in the network. Consequently, as
described in III-A, injected power will be curtailed for voltage
regulation and the financial analysis, done by the Algorithm 1,
is going to become obsolete for practical implementation.
Fig. 4. Bus voltages at F1 feeder during multiple P2P trading.
C. Losses Compensation Issue
Let’s consider another scenario in which a buyer at bus 27
purchases 5 kW from a seller at bus 26, that results in 0.02
kW hypothetical losses. If the same buyer purchases the same
amount of power from a seller at far-off bus 6, the transaction
losses increase to 0.48 kW. Thus, if the cost of losses is paid by
the buyer, the sellers at near distance with higher prices might
become more appealing than the sellers at a long distance
offering a lower price. Therefore, it is important to consider
the impact of losses within the financial trading layer.
In a grid-tied network, if the transaction losses are not paid
by the P2P participants, grid has to compensate the losses
for free. Let’s assume the trading scenario for a particular
time interval, given in Table II, where eight simultaneous
transactions are finalised. As is demonstrated in Table II, the
total P2P losses is 1.21 kW (4.1% of the total exchanged
power) for all transactions, which is high for such a small LV
network. In fact, if similar P2P transactions are carried out
throughout the year, the grid has to supply 42.4 MW excess
power in that year to compensate P2P losses which can cause
approximately $2200-$2700 financial losses.
TABLE II
DETERMINATION OF P2P TRANSACTION LOSSES
P2P Trading Exchanged Power Grid’s Losses Compensation
Buses, (i, j) (kW), ρ (·|i, j) (kW)
(2,3) 2.8
(2,6) 1.4
(4,19) 3.5
(5,14) 3.7
(6,27) 5.0 1.21
(8,21) 4.0
(10,25) 4.7
(11,26) 4.9
For a real LV P2P network with thousands of buses sprawled
over a large territory, the transaction losses could be more
pronounced. It can be intensified by the fact that anyone
from anywhere in the network can join a P2P network to
trade energy. Therefore, the amount of losses that has to be
compensated by the grid in a real system with significant P2P
transactions cannot be ignored. Otherwise, the grid operator
may experience substantial financial losses annually.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper highlights the possible network issues associated
with the P2P energy trading market. To do so, a simple P2P
trading framework is considered and implemented in a real
test system. Then, several simulation studies are carried out
to reveal the benefits of trading in such market, and concerns
regarding bus voltages and hypothetical P2P transaction losses.
It is shown that both buyers and sellers can benefit from a local
P2P market. However, the simulation results figure out that
over-voltage can happen when the rooftop solar penetration
is relatively high within an LV feeder during multiple P2P
transactions. Moreover, transaction losses might be a real
problem in such trading mechanism, where losses could be
compensated by the grid without financial return.
Please note that the model presented in this paper to evaluate
the feasibility of P2P trading mechanism can be applied to any
other financial algorithms without any modifications.
In future research, new strategies will be developed to bring
power network issues into the P2P energy trading framework.
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